The paper examines why, and under what conditions, certain interest groups adopt positive positions on international economic issues. It provides a case study of how UK trade unions formed their preferences on membership of the EMU. Previous explanations of this have tended to emphasise the international dimension -either the material benefits on offer or whether or not they became 'Europeanised'. A few authors are now exploring domestic political explanations instead. The paper builds on this growing literature to argue that the TUC, the peak association of organised labour in the UK, became extremely pro-EMU as part of a strategy to demonstrate its moderation to Tony Blair's centrist 'New' Labour party, which was distancing itself from unions to court business.
Signalling Moderation: UK Trade Unions, 'New Labour' and the Single Currency
Introduction
This paper is concerned with how domestic producer groups form preferences on international economic issues. It examines two aspects of this: first, whether it is primarily the domestic, or international, environments which shape these preferences; and, second, how umbrella bodies representing organisations with diverse interests aggregate these preferences into a common position.
To explore these issues the article provides a case study examining the attitude
of UK trade unions towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the 1990s
and 2000s. It focuses on the startling conversion of the UK's peak trade union association (the Trades Union Congress, or TUC) from strident antiEuropeanism to being the most pro-integration major organisation in the UK in the space of little over a dozen years. This conversion is surprising because it split the trade union movement between pro and EMU factions at a time when the TUC was struggling to appear relevant, and served no apparent purpose as the TUC was not in a position to influence the pro-market Conservative government of the time. The paper highlights an alternative motivation for the U-turn, explaining it as a central plank of the TUC's leadership's strategy for establishing a close relationship with Tony Blair's centrist 'New' Labour party.
There are two implications of this approach and findings that are relevant to the study of interest groups and politics. First, the paper contends that, contrary to the declarations of the TUC at the time, it was domestic politics rather than the merits of EMU which explains its enthusiasm for UK membership of the single currency. Second, it points to problems inherent in assumptions that 'peak' union, or employer organisations for that matter, accurately represent the views of their members in their entirety. As will be argued in the paper, positions taken by these umbrella bodies may conceal deep and divisive splits among members that can erupt into the open at any time. The paper thereby provides a case study of how 'weak' interest groups may have to resort to strategic political positioning to try to influence policymakers, complicating the task of identifying the underlying preferences of domestic groups.
UK trade unions and 'Europe'
Why was the TUC's strongly pro-EMU stance from the early 1990s paradoxical? The short answer is that it caused a deep split in the union movement between pro and anti-EMU factions, with its biggest and third biggest affiliated unions strongly opposing the TUC leadership's position.
Opinion polls at the time showed a consistent majority of ordinary union members against membership -for example, a MORI poll in August 1996 showed 55% of trade union members opposed to the single currency and only 38% in favour. Therefore the internal split within the TUC was anything but trivial.
Moreover, this split was arguably pointless as well as being self-inflicted as for five years after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty the UK was ruled by a Conservative government which was both anti-European and anti-union. In view of the dim prospects of the UK participating in EMU in the early to mid1990s the TUC's pro-EMU position therefore involved incurring substantial costs for no apparent gain.
I argue that the TUC's repositioning on Europe should be viewed in the context of a parallel drive by its leadership to remake its relationship with its putative allies in the Labour party. When Tony Blair became Labour leader in 1994 he moved the party sharply towards the centre-ground by adopting a probusiness stance that involved openly distancing it from the trade unions (Dorey 1999; Ludlam and Taylor 2003) . This presented the TUC's leadership with a dilemma over how to remain close to Labour in order to lobby for pro-trade union policies (Coulter 2014; Gould 1998; McIlroy 1998; Russel 2005) . Noticing that Labour was rapidly softening its own previously Euro-sceptical position to distinguish itself from the increasingly unpopular and anti-European Conservatives, the TUC leadership pushed a strongly-pro-EMU line in order to 'signal' its moderation to the party leadership. The fact that this position split the union movement between pro and anti-EMU factions, with the latter associated with the 'left-critical' bloc of anti-Blair unions, served to underline its seriousness of purpose.
This interpretation clashes with much of the existing political science literature on domestic interest groups and European integration, which largely ignores domestic considerations and explains the TUC's radical shift in attitudes towards integration by reference to the external economic and political benefits on offer (although the industrial relations literature has tended to be a little more sceptical of the benefits to unions of European integration generally, and monetary union in particular (cf. Wyman 2002)). Research into how domestic producer groups react to multilateral policy innovations such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) falls mostly into two camps.
The first consist of 'materialist' conceptions of preference formation, which relate actors' views on EMU directly to their position in the economy (Frieden 1991; Rogowski 1989) . These suggest the TUC, which represents unions in both the sheltered and tradeable sectors of the economy, should have been neutral on EMU (as opposed to the strongly pro-EMU stance that it took). The second is a more constructivist alternative which regards pro-EMU actors as being so as a result of having become 'Europeanised' (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Lea 1998; Strange 2002) . This approach endogenises the process of preference formation and accepts that actors may hold views based on a range of materialist and non-materialist concerns. Both approaches find it difficult to account for the strongly pro-EMU stance of the TUC, however, as its role as the peak association for the trade union movement ought to have seen it reflecting internally divergent views on the matter by remaining neutral.
It is in this light that the paper re-examines the TUC's abrupt European conversion. It turns on its head the prevailing notion that unions' responses to EMU stemmed purely from the international arena and suggests ways in which domestic political and economic situations may instead shape the way they formulate policy positions even on issues normally regarded as international.
The actions of the TUC in this light also suggest that apparently 'weak' interest groups may, almost by virtue of their detachment from other actors, be afforded an unusual degree of independence to strategically pursue overtly political campaigns. In an era of declining partisanship (Beramendi et al 2014) such strategies may become ever more important for interest groups representing both business and labour as they seek alternative ways to engage with political parties and governments across the political spectrum.
The empirical research for the paper is based on archival research and interviews with key players in the Labour Party and trade unions; mainly MPs, party advisers and union general secretaries. Documental research was carried out at the TUC Archives at London Metropolitan University, the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University and the Neil Kinnock Archives at Churchill College, Cambridge.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3, which follow, unpack some issues of interests, preference formation and attitudes to Europe pertaining to domestic groups. Section 4 models TUC-Labour interaction as a signalling game, the observable implications of which are examined further in section 5. The final section concludes. would be misleading to say membership is problem free' (TUC 1990: 8) .
Because of the lack of input into the design of EMU by domestic socio-economic groups (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 14) it has been widely assumed that trade unions were kept in the dark about the potential costs and benefits of EMU, as described above, prior to its launch. In fact, as argued below, the creation of the Single Market in the late 1980s had already sparked a lively debate within the union movement about European economic integration which intensified when EMU came onto the table. Specifically, these reservations revolved around the following concerns, which were widely discussed in the left wing and trade union press. 1
1. The institutional design of EMU was seen as problematical, especially the independent central bank with its disinflationary bias.
2. Countries with floating exchange rates can adjust these to maintain domestic industrial competitiveness. Inside EMU currencies are fixed in value and so the chief instrument of adjustment is real wages.
3. In recognition of this the Maastricht package included a 'social chapter' designed to safeguard social standards. However, the chapter remained clearly subordinate to the single market and EMU.
4. By elevating the Single Market from a formal to a real event EMU was expected to encourage cross-border mergers and acquisitions resulting in a growth in the size, number and importance of multi-national companies. This was expected to shift the balance of power in wage bargaining towards business.
5. There was doubt about Europe's suitability for a single currency because it was not an Optimum Currency Area -i.e. the adjustment mechanisms required to permit diverse national economies to live with centralised monetary authorities were underdeveloped (Mundell 1961 Secondly, the process is viewed teleologically, with little attention paid to its distributive consequences.
Research into how domestic producer groups react to European integration falls mostly into two camps: materialism and 'Europeanisation'. What are the main elements of these, and why are they inadequate to fully explain the position of the TUC in the1990s?
Materialism
Materialist explanations appreciate that the domestic economic impact of EMU is distributionally complex (Moravcsik 1998) . They emphasise the interplay between organised interests and political institutions, as they recognise that some economic actors attach greater value to monetary policy autonomy than exchange rate stability, while others approach this trade-off differently.
Whether a government fixes the exchange rate (for example by joining EMU)
or not is determined to some extent by the balance of power between these groups.
The 'societal' school within international political economy has tried to bridge the gap with comparative political economy by relating domestic actors'
monetary policy preferences to export orientation or factor endowments (Frieden 1991 , Rogowski 1989 ). Frieden and Rogowski are less interested in accounting for particular events than in providing universal laws that describe what will happen under certain circumstances. They do this by using basic economic theory to generate propositions about the preferences of different actors -who wins and who loses from a particular policy. Consequently, their models make a number of unrealistic assumptions about the operation of the domestic and international economies and about the behaviour of domestic interest groups. When the materialist model is applied to the decision of the TUC on whether to back EMU it runs into the following problems:
1. Materialist theories of preference formation focus on preferences while telling us little about outcomes. A key objection is that they effectively assume that the costs of organising support or opposition to particular policies are zero, ignoring the collective action problems endemic to political mobilisation (Olson 1965) . Also, they would seem to work predominantly in situations where actors' preferences are pre-strategic i.e. they do not take into account the preferences and strategies of other actors. The Frieden/Rogowski model also implies that the UK should have joined EMU in the first wave in 1999, as a pro-EMU coalition between labour and capital (the TUC and the CBI) pushed for this in the mid-1990s. The UK didn't, and hasn't.
They ignore the potential importance of ideology in shaping preferences, even though these interact with material forces and help to constitute actors'
perceptions of what their interests are. Ideology may explain why, for instance, the UK's two large 'generalist' unions, the TGWU 2 and GMB, had completely different policy stances on EMU despite being of a relatively similar size and composition (see below).
3. Another weakness in the materialist account of EMU is that it has trouble in explaining changes in unions' views over time. If preferences are anchored in objective material interests then major shifts in these should occur only in line with profound transformations in underlying economic structures. By their very nature these transformations are not rapid, and yet the official policy of the UK's TUC changed on no less than five separate occasions in the 15 years after the UK joined the European Community/Union (Teague 1989 ).
4. Finally, and most importantly, materialist accounts of preferences can't account for the TUC's support for one particular exchange rate regime (the fixed parity of EMU) when it represented unions organising workers in both the traded and non-traded sectors of the UK's economy. While authors like Moravcsik (1998) correctly link the outcomes of interstate bargains over European integration to the preferences of domestic actors, this approach cannot by itself shed much light on why peak associations adopt counter-intuitive positions.
'Europeanisation'
Many explanations for the TUC's stance on European economic integration generally, and EMU in particular, argue that, in common with other actors, it became 'Europeanised', deciding to pursue its policy goals through the European, rather than domestic, arena. saw the TUC as ideally placed to take the initiative in pushing for a strong EU social agenda to counter moves to enhance the Single Market at the expense of its social dimension (Lea 1998: 137) . This was an attractive role for the TUC as it had become progressively marginalised by the aggressively anti-union Thatcher government.
What are the flaws in the Europeanisation thesis? Why isn't it a satisfactory explanation for the TUC's support for EMU?
The first issue concerns the definition of 'Europe' itself. Advocates of importing Social Europe into the UK have tended to be rather vague about exactly what it entails (Watson 2006: 145-155) . Critics of pro-European elements in the Labour Party and trade unions argue that these tended to erroneously equate the ESM with the social-democratic 'Nordic' welfare state model. However, as Scharpf (1999) has observed, the EU may be more emblematic of 'negative', pro-market intervention.
The TUC called repeatedly for the creation of a pan-European wage bargaining system to assist the adjustment of wage bargaining structures in high-inflation countries like the UK (TUC 1992: 5) . However, such a system never got off the ground because of a lack of the appropriate trans-national industrial relations institutions, as the organisation most suited to coordinating this function, the European Trade Union Confederation, wholly lacked the power to do so. 
Policy Preferences as Political Signals
The What is meant by credibility? In this paper, credibility is understood to have at least two meanings, both of which were important for the TUC. The first concerns the credibility to do something: for a union this means delivering low wages, or cooperation on training; for a government or central bank it may mean providing low inflation, perhaps by tying its own hands to prevent it manipulating interest rates for political gain. Credibility is therefore closely linked with the notion of capacity. For the TUC, possessing credibility meant the capacity to help produce particular policy outcomes for Labour, which implied it being able to deliver what it promised.
The second meaning is related to this but more ideological, to do with reassuring New Labour that the TUC was not led by corporatist dinosaurs and would be a willing partner in labour market reform. At the heart of the problem was the UK's deep-seated tradition of voluntarism in industrial relations. In a nutshell, the TUC's task was to find a way of surmounting its estrangement from politics in order to be able to fulfil its insider role as an advocate for unions within government. The response of the TUC leadership to this conundrum, once it had begun to modernise itself following the organisation's re-launch in 1994, was therefore to look for indirect ways to advertise this fact to New Labour. This situation is arguably akin to the well-known 'beer and quiche' game (Cho and Kreps 1987) , in that it is a game of asymmetric information where one player lacks knowledge about the preferences and attributes of the other.
Labour-TUC interaction as a signalling game
Firstly, the TUC's lack of traction with New Labour was partly a problem of information asymmetry, as Blair could not be certain that the unions would not cause trouble for it in government if they were included in policymaking i.e.
that the TUC's 1994 re-launch and professed change of goals was real and not cosmetic. Secondly, a union movement headed by a reliable and ideologically compatible TUC still potentially offered strategic assets to both party and government. Thirdly, given the UK's pluralist structure of interest representation as well as the paucity, by the mid-1990s, of formal channels of party-union communication, the TUC was obliged to demonstrate, rather than being able to directly communicate, its attributes to New Labour through its actions.
How does adopting a very pro-EMU position in defiance of its internal critics help the TUC leadership build bridges with Labour? For the TUC, the issue of EMU was a signal. By strongly supporting UK participation in a single currency the TUC was attempting to show to a future Labour government that it had sloughed off its radical, obstructionist past and was now a responsible social partner. This was a rational and effective strategy because New Labour (Scott 2004:206, 207 ).
These sentiments were expressed in interviews with Blair's former advisers carried out for this article. Holden (2002) argues, similarly, that pro-European attitudes became emblematic of moderation and political modernisation for Blair. The potential payoff for the TUC of its revealed preference on EMU (a highly pro-EMU stance) was therefore not so much immediate participation by the UK in EMU in the mid-1990s (which the Conservatives had anyway ruled out) but increased influence over domestic industrial relations policy.
However, talk being cheap, to make this overture to New Labour credible it also needed to visibly incur costs. By splitting the union movement into pro and anti-EMU factions the TUC demonstrated that it was serious about change.
A significant 'left-critical' bloc of unions remained hostile to European economic integration and unconvinced of the need to build bridges with Blair in the first place. By ignoring this opposition the TUC demonstrated its autonomy. Of course this strategy was not without its risks. Splits are something most organisations normally prefer to avoid. They can be damaging because they increase the organisational costs of collective action, hence other actors may regard a divided movement as an unreliable negotiating partner.
However, the TUC leadership worked hard at managing the agenda at
Congress to ensure this did not descend into open rebellion (see next section).
The institutional structure of the TUC following its re-launch afforded its leadership considerable autonomy with which to pursue its modernising and pro-EMU line.
Specifying the game
In the game the 'sending' player tries to resolve the information asymmetry by 'signalling' through its actions, and the 'receiver' then responds to the message by choosing how to react. The TUC is the sender here and hopes to convince the Labour Party (LP) to engage with it by sending a costly signal (supporting UK membership of EMU even though this divides the union movement). LP is unsure whether the TUC is moderate (M) or extreme (E). It is prepared to deal with a moderate TUC as the financial cost to Labour of Exit from the partyunion relationship makes the unions difficult to ignore, and there could be The game shows that, given the payoff structure specified above, it may benefit the TUC to adopt a costly signalling strategy on EMU. The TUC needs the game to produce a separating equilibrium. This will exist where LP believes the TUC is signalling truthfully that supporting EMU means it is moderate and not extreme. If LP finds itself in the S information set (having observed the TUC's signal) then, given the TUC's strategy of choosing S if it is moderate, LP can assume it is at the top right hand node and its best choice is engage which gives it a payoff 1, as against 0 if it doesn't engage. In the NS information set LP would assume it is at the bottom left node pondering whether to engage with an extreme TUC. Here, LP chooses to not engage, giving it a payoff of 0 as opposed to -2 if it engages. Hence, the TUC's signalling strategy is successful In examining the evolution of attitudes towards European economic integration on the British left several things should be noted at the outset. 
Most of the TUC's affiliated unions accepted the advantages of closer European
integration by the start of the 1990s. However, the TUC's modernising general secretary, John Monks, consistently adopted positions on EMU and economic integration generally which were far in advance of the rest of the trade union movement. They were also more monetarist, and this generated considerable friction with some of the main unions which the TUC had to work hard to contain. Monks also vigorously signalled his organisation's pro-Europeanism to Labour politicians who were themselves reorienting the party in a proEuropean direction -both in opposition and, after 1997, in government. In addition, the TUC secretariat's pro-EMU line closely paralleled that of the UK's main employer's organisation, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). The CBI advocated early UK participation in EMU, although its overall position deviated from the TUC's in that it opposed Maastricht's social chapter.
The shifting preferences of the labour movement
The shift in attitudes on Europe within the wider British labour movement 
Lack of consensus among the sectoral unions
If there was internal TUC dissent over EMU then why was it not apparent at the TUC's annual Congress? The apparent consensus at Congress over the TUC's pro-EMU line camouflaged deep-seated disagreement among its member trade unions. Only once, at the 1998 TUC Congress, did an anti-EMU motion (from the communist-dominated miners' union) slip onto the conference agenda (Strange 2002: 340) . However, Rosamond has analysed TUC debates on Europe during the early 1990s when policy was being formed and concludes that a considerable amount of agenda management by the TUC leadership took place (Rosamond 1993: 43-7) . Diverse views on the issue were amalgamated into anodyne composite motions that delegates of all shades of opinion found hard to oppose. Overtly 'anti' submissions were simply excluded from the agenda. Rosamond's findings have been criticised by scholars arguing that UK unions became Europeanised, with the lack of debate at Congress simply reflecting this pro-integrationist mood (Strange 2002: 334-337 (Bieler 2003) .
The most formidable overt opponents of EMU were the generalist Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), the public sector Unison (formed in 1993 from the amalgamation of three Euro-sceptical public sector unions: NALGO, COHSE and NUPE) and the MSF. These have often described, somewhat dismissively, as a minority, albeit it a significant one within the TUC. Yet it is worth noting that in 1995 the TGWU and Unison were the largest and third largest TUC affiliated unions respectively and were partially joined in the mid1990s by its second largest union, the General, Municipal and Boilermakers (GMB), which moved from a Euro-enthusiastic position to one that was somewhat more sceptical by the end of the decade. While the GMB's leadership had been initially pro-EMU a third of the unions' members worked in the public sector and were concerned about the impact of the convergence criteria on public spending. The GMB's highly decentralised structure allowed opposition to be expressed at the branch and regional level, and Rosamond notes that a certain amount of agenda management was practised at GMB conferences to minimise dissent (Rosamond 1993: 432) . Smaller unions which opposed EMU also included the firemen (FBU), miners (NUM), train-drivers (ASLEF), print-workers (GPMU), furniture makers (FTAT) and construction workers (UCATT).
The vocal opposition of the TGWU was highly significant, as it has traditionally been regarded as the dominant force in the TUC and the labour movement in general (Taylor 2000: 103, 195) . Anti-EMU unions had varying reasons for their opposition. Interestingly, the TGWU (and MSF) had largely accepted the inevitability of European economic integration by 1992. Their oppositional stance was directed towards steering EMU in a more pro-labour direction for which the preservation of national economic autonomy was deemed essential.
As a generalist union, but one with a significant proportion of its members involved in export-competing manufacturing, the TGWU's general secretary, Bill Morris, also had a particular concern over the UK's inability to devalue inside EMU (Morris 1990 Monks' position as 'frankly wrong' (The Times, 14 October 1997).
While both the TUC Congress and the GC had broadly supported EMU entry during the first half of the 1990s, it had been emphasised again and again that this was on condition that the single currency was accompanied by: 1)
concerted EU-wide action to combat unemployment; 2) the extension of qualified majority voting to areas of social policy to prevent the UK government using its veto; 3) a 'democratic and accountable' central bank.
Once it became clear that social policy coordination was going to be limited and that the Maastricht convergence criteria ruled out political control over monetary policy, their attitudes changed. However, the TUC secretariat/leadership continued to call for early UK membership of the single currency.
Effectively, therefore, its own leadership split the TUC over the issue of the single currency, relying on the TUC's right-wing faction to back up its position.
This 'pro-Commission' group which sided with the TUC secretariat centred on the engineering union (AEEU) and, at least initially, the GMB. This bloc had at least one eye on the goal: '…securing a convergence of opinion within the labour movement as a whole' (Rosamond 1993: 433) 
Conclusion
The argument of this paper is that the TUC's apparently sub-optimal policy position of strong support for EMU becomes explicable if viewed as being part of a series of nested games played between it, its affiliated unions, the Labour party and the CBI. The TUC's overarching aim in the period which followed the signing of the Maastricht Treaty was to build bridges with what it feared would be an unusually pro-business Labour government with a disinclination to consult with it on industrial and labour market reform. Its strategy was to signal, through its strong support for EMU, that the TUC now accepted Euromonetarism, was eager to work with employers within a European-style system of 'social partnership' and was operationally independent from the big left-wing unions.
As well as being an examination of how weak interest groups can attempt to gain influence over policymakers, this paper also hopefully suggests a few refinements to how the international relations and 'Europeanisation' literatures deal with the process of domestic preference formation. It underlines the difficulties in assuming that producer groups such as unions will line up neatly according to their material incentives or degree of Europeanisation. The issues examined in this paper suggest these theories are not particularly helpful in explaining why the views of interest groups can shift quite suddenly even when the underlying material facts or prevailing ideologies remain largely unchanged. Instead, domestic political considerations, including the need to formal alliances with, and gain insider access to, political parties may also be important.
